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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SIXTH AND
SEVENTH EDFS UP TO 31 DECEMBER 1997
1. The European Development Funds (EDFs) trace
their origin back to international agreements drawn up
between the Member States of the European Union
and 71 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries
and to Council decisions relating to the association of
24 overseas countries and territories (OCTs). The
Commission is responsible for the administration of
the EDFs without prejudice to the European Invest-
ment Bank's responsibilities for the administration of
certain forms of aid.
2. In 1997 the sixth(1) and seventh EDFs(2) were
being implemented concurrently because although, in
principle, each one was limited to five years, there is no
time-limit on the spending of the appropriations
allocated. Only when the Commission considers that
the implementation of a particular fund is nearing
completion does it transfer the balance to a subsequent
Fund.
3. Table I.1 shows the utilisation of the sixth and
seventh EDFs as at 31 December 1997. For the
financial year 1997, the payments amounted to
1 212,7 Mio ECU, whilst the net commitments reached
616,0 Mio ECU. The corresponding amounts for 1996
had been 1 317,4 Mio ECU and 964,9 Mio ECU
respectively. Twelve years after it came into force,
disbursements from the sixth EDF represented 85,6 %
of its resources; at the same stage of the fifth EDF they
represented 87,6 %. The payment rate for the seventh
EDF stood at 55,6 % at the end of the seventh year of
implementation; for the sixth EDF it stood at 63,9 %.
_________________
(1) The Lome Â III Convention (OJ L 86, 31.3.1986).
(2) The Lome Â IV Convention (OJ L 229, 17.8.1991).
Official Journal of the European Communities 151 17.11.98 EN4. The financial protocol for the seventh EDF expired
on 1 March 1995, and on 3 November 1995 the ACP±
EC Council of Ministers decided that the balances
outstanding for the financial instruments relating to the
system for stabilising export earnings (Stabex), to the
special financing facility for mineral products (Sysmin),
as well as to structural adjustment support, emergency
aid and assistance for refugees, would all remain
allocated to their respective objectives until used up.
5. On 4 November 1995, the ACP States and the
Member States of the European Union signed an
agreement amending the fourth Lome Â Convention.
After ratification of this agreement, the corresponding
eighth EDF, for which an overall amount was fixed for
ACP countries and OCTs at 13 167 Mio ECU, entered
into force on 1 June 1998(3).
6. In 1995, it was agreed that, of the resources
allocated to the eighth EDF, 292 Mio ECU was to
come from transfers from previous EDFs of which
13 Mio ECU coming from the balances of the closed
fourth EDF. This decision, however, only partly
resolves the problem of unpaid outstanding balances
from closed EDFs(4). In fact, as at 31 December 1997,
these outstanding balances amounted to 335,9 Mio
ECU, i.e. the funds transferred from the fourth to the
sixth EDFs (123,1 Mio ECU)(5) and from the fifth to
the seventh EDFs (444,2 Mio ECU)(6) had given rise
to only 231,4 Mio ECU of payments, i.e. 40,8 % of the
transfers. This being so, the Commission should
Table I.1 Ð Utilisation of the sixth and seventh EDFs as at 31 December 1997
(Mio ECU)
Resources and utilisation (ACP + OCT) Sixth EDF Seventh EDF Total
Initial allocation 7 500,0 10 940,0 18 440,0
Resources collected 8 103,3 (1) 5 703,5 (2) 13 806,8
Resources to be collected from Member States 0,0 5 940,1 5 940,1
Transfers of resources between sixth and seventh EDF (181,7) 181,7
Net resources 7 921,6 11 825,3 19 746,9
Payments prior to 1997 6 603,8 5 536,2 12 140,0
1997 payments 173,8 1 038,9 1 212,7
Decisions remaining to be settled 756,0 3 743,4 4 499,4
Utilisation 7 533,6 10 318,5 17 852,1
Transfers to eighth EDF (39,0) (253,0) (292,0)
Balance available for re-use 349,0 1 253,8 1 602,8
Advances made for eighth EDF
CDI 25,3 25,3
Stabex 76,2 76,2
Payments made for eighth EDF
CDI 21,2 21,2
Stabex 72,9 72,9
(1) Including resources transferred from the fourth EDF
(2) Including resources transferred from the fifth EDF.
Source: On-line accounting system (OLAS).
_________________
(3) See OJ L 156, 29.5.1998, p. 107.
(4) Already mentioned in paragraph 12.07 of 1996 annual
report (OJ C 348, 18.11.1997).
(5) Reduction by 1,6 Mio ECU compared to 1996.
(6) Reduction by 12,7 Mio ECU compared to 1996.
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that in future appropriations are not left unused.
7. In 1997 again a number of payments have been
made on behalf of the eighth EDF which was not yet
ratified in 1997 (see paragraph 20).
OTHER OBSERVATIONS
Introduction
8. In the course of the 1997 DAS audit, a number of
problems were identified which did not have an
implication for the statement itself, but have an impact
on the soundness of the financial management. These
are treated below.
Non-respect of procedures
9. As mentioned in Part II of this report concerning
the statement of assurance there is a high incidence of
formal errors in that the legislation applicable to the
EDF (conventions, internal agreements, financial reg-
ulations) was not followed. Moreover, in a considerable
number of transactions the Court found that the
Commission did not properly apply the EDFs' internal
rules.
10. Changes to contractual provisions as regards the
period of performance, period of contract, or currency
of payment, are frequently made by all parties
concerned (Commission, national authorising officer
(NAO), beneficiary) without written notification.
Moreover, usually no justification in writing as regards
the part of the contract payable in foreign currency is
provided. That makes the management and follow up
of projects unnecessarily difficult and could have
negative financial consequences in case of legal
disputes.
11. Many payment orders were issued by NAOs,
without the date of signature. Equally the date of
endorsement by the delegation was often not indicated.
In a number of cases where the dates were indicated,
the contracts were endorsed by the delegation before
signature of the NAO.
12. Contrary to internal rules, service contracts
included contingencies and did not respect applicable
ceilings for per diems. The replenishment of imprest
accounts for work programmes was not, as prescribed,
limited to justified expenditure, but included additional
advances as well.
13. The high number of cases in which the legislation
and/or the internal instructions were not respected may
be a symptom of unnecessary and sometimes unrealis-
tic rules which render the administration of the EDFs
less coherent and less reliable. While the Commission's
services should adhere to the rules, the whole set of the
EDFs' regulations and internal rules should be
examined to assess their appropriateness.
Liquidated damages in case of delayed
performance
14. In two contracts it was found that no rate nor
maximum amount was specified for liquidated damages
in case of delayed performance. This deprives the
contracting authority of the possibility of claiming
damages if such occur. However, even when the
contracts contain clauses on delayed performance, the
rights and penalties prescribed are not exercised. It is
generally left to the NAO's discretion whether to apply
these rules. The audit revealed that out of 62 cases
examined there were 10 contracts with delayed
performance. In none of these cases was the right to
claim damages (amounting to 0,7 Mio ECU) exer-
cised(7). The Commission should be more vigilant and
should require the NAO to provide justifications in
cases where the rights on liquidated damages are not
exercised.
Treasury management
15. Although improvements of the treasury manage-
ment have been made during 1997, a number of
problems still remain unresolved.
16. Payments made locally in the ACP States are
initially recorded on the basis of the bank statements
received from the national paying agents in a suspense
_________________
(7) In three cases it was even a contractual obligation to claim
these penalties (see Part II paragraph 37(a)).
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attributed to projects on the basis of supporting
documents received from the delegations and cleared
as final expenditure after checks made by the authoris-
ing officer and the financial controller. This procedure
is not, however, uniformly applied. Some staff of the
Commission do not record the payments made by the
national paying agents until they receive all the
supporting documents. As a result the balances of
some local bank accounts shown in OLAS are
overstated during the year. At year end, the differences
between the OLAS figures and the actual bank
balances are booked as bank reconciliation items to
give a true and fair view of the bank accounts(8).
17. Contrary to Article 319.1 of Lome Â IV, five ACP
States(9) do not have a national paying agent bank
account to execute local payments. For one of these
countries(10) the local payments are executed by the
Commission's central services in Brussels from Eur-
opean paying agents.
18. In contrast to the situation concerning all other
European paying agency accounts, there has not yet
been a fresh tender for the continued operation of the
Stabex bank account, which was opened in 1994 for one
year and subsequently tacitly renewed year by year.
19. Contrary to contractual provisions which do not
allow bank charges, available balances have been
reduced by such charges in one European and 12
ACP paying agent institutions. The Commission should
not have accepted these charges and the amounts
should have been booked in a transitory account(11).
20. The bank balance on the account with the
National Housing and Savings Bank of Liberia has
had no movements since 1990 and no bank statements
nor any other supporting documentation were available
as at 13 October 1998. As it is unlikely that this amount
can be recovered(12) the EDFauthorising and account-
ing officers should write it off.
AUDIT EXECUTED ON RISK CAPITAL
OPERATIONS FINANCED FROM EDF
RESOURCES
Introduction
21. During 1997, the Court has executed an audit on
risk capital operations (RCOs), the results of which will
be published in Special Report No 2498. This chapter
gives a summary of the findings of the audit.
22. Risk capital constitutes a method of financing that
also exists under both the Lome Â Conventions. It allows
reimbursable financial assistance to be given under
favourable conditions to priority sectors in ACP States
and overseas countries and territories in particular
where the beneficiaries' capacity to borrow does not
allow financing from the own resources of the EIB.
23. It is used for financing investments in both the
public and private sectors given directly or indirectly in
the form of:
(a) individual loans, loans via an ACP State or global
loans via a financial intermediary;
(b) loans with participating rights;
(c) equity participations.
24. The funds form part of the EDF but are
administered by the EIB on behalf of the Community
and in accordance with the Bank's statute and the
financial regulations related to the EDF(13). The
amounts earmarked for risk capital operations (RCOs)
under the Lome Â III and Lome Â IV Conventions are
respectively 615 and 850 Mio ECU.
25. The terms of risk capital operations depend on the
characteristics of the individual projects or programme
financed but shall be more favourable than those of
subsidised loans(14) and in the case of loans the interest _________________
(8) Booked on account 6 1 6 0504.
(9) Angola, Comoros, Djibouti, St Christopher and Nevis and
Uganda.
(10) Uganda.
(11) Amounting to 4 139,35 ECU.
(12) Balance of 1 316,32 ECU.
_________________
(13) See Articles 10(2) and 15(1) of the internal agreement on
the financing and administration of Community aid under
the Lome Â IV Convention.
(14) Loans from the Bank's own resources benefiting from an
EDF interest subsidy.
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of on-lending the interest margin is to be used for
development purposes after administrative costs, and
exchange rate and financial risks have been taken into
account.
26. Amounts decided upon, committed (net) and
disbursed as at 31.12.1997(16) are as follows:
(in Mio ECU)
Amount
decided %
Amount of
net
commit-
ment
% Amount
disbursed %
Lome Â III 645 (1) 107 501 83 495 82
Lome Â IV 787 95 756 92 411 50
Total 1 432 100 1 257 88 906 64
(1) Including amounts decided upon but for which initial commitment
has been annulled.
Conduct of the audit
27. The audit has been conducted on the basis of the
tripartite agreement concluded between the EIB, the
Commission and the European Court of Auditors and
has taken into account the recommendation of the
European Parliament inviting these three institutions
to make regular and frequent on the spot audits of
actions realised by the EIB under mandate.
28. The Court examined 42 RCOs of which 33
projects were visited on the spot comprising an
examination of the operations of financial intermedi-
aries (FIs) and of the final beneficiaries of the risk
capital financing.
29. Although the Commission's filing system has
improved in the course of the Court's audit, the
information kept by the Commission was still not
complete and documentation had to be made available
to the Court directly by the Bank. However, important
information was provided at such a late stage that it
hampered an efficient conduct of the Court's audit.
Conclusion
30. The manner in which risk capital operations have
been prepared, implemented and monitored by the
Bank does not give rise to observations. Nevertheless,
the transparency and effectiveness of the operations
can still be improved.
31. The criteria, which should guide the allocation of
risk capital resources, are very general. The Bank is
thus more or less free to choose between risk capital or
its own resources in making loans. The justification of
the decision to use risk capital funds does not clearly
emerge from the project appraisal documentation.
32. The use of different types of financing (direct
loans, loans via an ACP State, global loans) has led to
unequal treatment of final beneficiaries: while some
beneficiaries benefit from the 3 % maximum interest
rate stipulated in the Lome Â IV Convention, others have
to pay market rates. Though not the only determining
factor, the effects of exchange rate fluctuations play an
important role in setting interest rates above the 3 %
level. These effects and thus the justification for higher
interest rates can be calculated only after loans have
been fully repaid. In addition, in the case of loans with
participating rights, the total remuneration to the EIB
Ð being at least partly dependant on the result of the
beneficiary enterprises Ð could well exceed the 3 %
limit.
33. Provisions concerning the use of the interest
margin by the financial intermediary are often not
clear. The Bank should ensure that finance contracts
stipulate precisely how the amount of the interest
margin is to be used and that any such use is in
compliance with the provisions of the Lome Â IV
Convention.
34. Support to the private sector through global loans
has been given mainly to existing Ð instead of to
emerging Ð SMEs, which moreover often benefitted
from financing from the FIs' other resources.
35. An ex post evaluation system is needed to provide
information about the viability of operations having
benefitted from risk capital finance and their real
_________________
(15) Under Lome Â III the interest rate shall not be higher than
8 %.
(16) ACP States only.
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of the ACP States. Such an evaluation system should be
developed in cooperation between the Bank and the
Commission.
36. In addition, the Commission should play a more
active role at the appraisal stage and regarding the
evaluation of the overall effects of RCO on the
development of the ACP State. Guidelines should be
developed setting out the responsibilities of and the
procedures to be followed by the services concerned.
37. The preceding recommendations are made in the
context of improving the existing systems of manage-
ment of RCOs. However, alternative systems should be
considered. As a matter of fact, the Commission's role
in the management of the RCOs seems to be limited in
practice to an exchange of information with the Bank.
The Commission is not involved in a variety of tasks
(appraisal, accounting, monitoring and evaluation)
which should fall within its responsibilities for the
financing of risk capital operations. The Court there-
fore suggests that consideration should be given to the
possibility of entrusting the full responsibility for RCOs
to the Bank with no involvement of the European
Development Funds. In this context it is noted that
repayments of and interest on risk capital funds are not
credited to the EDFs at present.
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